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Judging from the Wrong Side of the Tracks: 
Louisiana’s Theory of Quasi-possession and Franks 
Investment Company L.L.C. v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Company 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that after more than 70 years of using something, 
someone destroyed it and stripped it from your possession 
overnight. Now picture being denied compensation because a court 
was unfamiliar with the relevant law that could provide a remedy. 
Nothing seems more frustrating, yet this is exactly what occurred in 
Franks Investment Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.1 Despite the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently 
affirming the decision,2 Franks is poor precedent for future 
Louisiana quasi-possession jurisprudence because it strictly applied 
the law of possession to a pure quasi-possession case.3 
Franks arose in the context of a nationwide dispute as old and 
familiar as that between the wild Bo Duke and the stiff county 
commissioner, Boss Hogg.4 For decades, railroad companies 
provided and maintained a number of private railroad crossings for 
farmers, allowing farmers convenient access to and from their land.5 
The railroad companies developed these crossways, mostly as a 
courtesy for farmers who granted the railroads a right-of-way for 
them to lay their rail lines across rural property.6 After years of 
allowing farmers passage, however, one railroad—Union Pacific 
Railroad Company—folded to economic pressures and opted to 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by ANNA SCARDULLA. 
 1. Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 6157484, at 
*1 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). Because of the 
procedural complexity of this case, a number of footnotes will reference cases 
entitled “Franks Investment Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.” For clarification 
purposes, when discussed in the body of this Comment, the term “Franks” refers to 
the juridical person, Franks Investment Company. When italicized, the term 
“Franks” refers to the district level case referenced in this footnote. 
 2. Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 464 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 3. Louisiana Civil Code article 3421 defines quasi-possession as “[t]he 
exercise of a real right, such as a servitude, with the intent to have it as one’s own  
. . . .” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421 (2013). 
 4. See generally Dukes of Hazzard (CBS television broadcast). 
 5. For a discussion of claims based on similar factual backgrounds to those 
relevant to this Comment, see generally Franks, 2011 WL 6157484; Faulk v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 449 F. App’x 357 (5th Cir. 2011); Seber v. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co., 350 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App. 2011).  
 6. See generally Franks, 2011 WL 6157484; Faulk, 449 F. App’x 357; 
Seber, 350 S.W.3d 640.  
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close some of its private railroad crossings across the country in 
2005.7 
Having lost their ability to conveniently pass from one side of 
their land to the other, farmers are looking to sue.8 A farmer’s ability 
and avenue through which to sue the railroad can vary;9 however, 
                                                                                                             
 7. Brief for Appellee at 7−9, Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 464 F. 
App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-30632). Union Pacific contended: 
[C]rossings impose maintenance burdens on the railroad that far exceed 
the maintenance required at areas of track without a crossing, costing the 
railroad an estimated $800.00 per square foot for installation and 
maintenance . . . . In the past fifteen years or so, federal policy has 
encouraged railroads to reduce the number of private crossings in order 
to improve public safety and enhance interstate rail transportation. The 
Federal Railroad Administration has promulgated policies encouraging 
railroads to close redundant and dangerous crossings. Union Pacific 
therefore began analyzing the quality, safety, and number of crossings on 
its tracks and identified crossings it believed should be closed. 
Id. (citation omitted). However, in 2008, the Louisiana Legislature passed a law 
that requires railroad companies to obtain permission from the Louisiana Public 
Service Commission before closing or removing a private railroad crossing. LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:394 (2004). For closure, railroad companies must meet the 
high burden of showing that the private crossing “unreasonably burdens or 
substantially interferes with rail transportation.” Id. Attempting to avoid these 
stringent procedural limitations, railroads have challenged section 48:394 on 
constitutional grounds. See Faulk, 449 F. App’x 357 (staying the constitutional 
question until ownership issues were settled between parties), on remand to No. 
07-0554, 2013 WL 1193069 (W.D. La. Mar. 22, 2013). 
 8. For a discussion of claims based on similar factual backgrounds to those 
relevant to this Comment, see generally Franks, 2011 WL 6157484; Faulk, 449 F. 
App’x 357; Seber, 350 S.W.3d 640. 
 9. A farmer’s ability and avenue through which to sue the railroad is often 
dependent on two things: (1) whether the right-of-way agreement originally 
entered into between the parties consisted of transferring full ownership of the 
land beneath the rail lines to the railroad or merely consisted of granting a right of 
use in favor of the railroad on the farmer’s property, and (2) whether the right-of-
way agreement explicitly obligates the railroad to provide and maintain the 
crossways. The following diagram is illustrative: 
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 If . . .  And . . . Then . . .
Variation 1 the right-of-
way agreement 
transferred full 
ownership of 
land 
underneath the 
rail lines to the 
railroad 
the right-of-way 
agreement explicitly 
burdens the railroad 
with providing and 
maintaining the 
crossways, 
 
a farmer can bring a 
Louisiana petitory 
action, asserting full 
ownership of a 
servitude in the 
crossways; even so, it 
is customary to bring 
a Louisiana 
possessory action 
first, asserting the 
quasi-possession of a 
servitude of passage 
in the crossways. 
Variation 2 the right-of-
way agreement 
transferred full 
ownership of 
land 
underneath the 
rail lines to the 
railroad  
 
the right-of-way 
agreement does not 
burden the railroad 
with any affirmative 
or negative duties 
relative to the 
crossways, 
 
a farmer can only 
bring a Louisiana 
possessory action, 
asserting the quasi-
possession of a 
servitude of passage 
in the crossways. 
Variation 3 the right-of-
way agreement 
grants the 
railroad a right-
of-use servitude 
across the 
farmer’s 
property 
 
the right-of-way 
agreement explicitly 
burdens the railroad 
with providing and 
maintaining the 
crossways, 
 
a farmer can bring a 
breach of contract 
action against the 
railroad; even so, 
alternative remedies 
may be available. 
 
Variation 4 the right-of-
way agreement 
grants the 
railroad a right-
of-use servitude 
across the 
farmer’s 
property 
 
the right-of-way 
agreement does not 
burden the railroad 
with any affirmative 
or negative duties 
relative to the 
crossways, 
 
a farmer has no 
petitory, possessory, 
or breach of contract 
claims available; even 
so, alternative 
remedies may be 
available. 
 
See generally A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 256–79, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE 515–58 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing the facets of the petitory action 
generally); Id. § 332–43, at 650–81 (discussing the facets of the possessory action 
generally); A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 176, in 4 LOUISIANA 
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 476–79 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the petitory action in 
relation to protecting the right of a servitude specifically); YIANNOPOULOS, supra, 
PROPERTY § 332–43, at 650–81 (discussing the facets of the possessory action 
generally); YIANNOPOULOS, supra, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 177, at 480 (discussing 
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most parties at least begin by asserting the quasi-possession of a real 
right of passage, or a servitude,10 in the private crossways through a 
Louisiana possessory action.11 
The federal district court in Franks was the first to hear the 
merits of a Louisiana possessory action concerning the crossway 
closures.12 As the first published ruling on the issue, Franks has the 
potential to set the legal standard for future cases with similar facts. 
Yet, in strictly applying the laws of possession, without recognizing 
the unique law that Louisiana scholarship and jurisprudence has 
attributed to a quasi-possession claim, the Franks court utilized the 
wrong line of reasoning. The court did not allow the plaintiff and 
defendant in the case to present relevant evidence on the true 
issue—the quasi-possession of a servitude in the land and 
crossways. This Comment discusses the flawed analysis in Franks, 
asserting that the court inappropriately applied the law of possession 
in a pure quasi-possession case. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the facts, legal framework, and 
holding of Franks Investment Co. L.L.C. v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co. Part II analyzes the Franks court’s reasoning, positing that the 
                                                                                                             
 
the possessory action in relation to protecting the right of a servitude specifically); 
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 639–45 (2013) (rules governing the creation of a right-of-use 
servitude). 
 10. See infra Part II.A. The only real rights that can be quasi-possessed in 
Louisiana are predial servitudes and personal servitudes. See BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL VOL. 
XXVIII (4th ed. 1924), reprinted in LA. STATE LAW INST., PRESCRIPTION, in 5 
CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 112 n.21 (La. State Law Inst. Trans., 1972) 
(“Possession is not even applicable to all immovable real rights, but only to those 
which can be physically exercised.”); MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL 
LAW, VOL. 1 PT. 2, 341 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 2005). 
 11. Under Louisiana law, the possessory action is the legal avenue by which 
possessors seek judicial recognition and protection of their physical contact with 
and stake of dominance in a thing. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3655 (2013). In 
cases such as these, establishing possession first can be a beneficial tactic in light 
of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 48:390. In 2008, the Louisiana Legislature 
mandated that all private railroad crossings closed “since January 1, 2006, shall be 
re-opened upon the attainment of thirty years peaceful and otherwise uninterrupted 
use or possession of servitude of use or passage across the railroad grade crossing 
with or without title.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:390 (2004). Section 48:390, 
however, has been questioned on constitutional grounds. See Henry v. Union Pac. 
R.R. Co., No. 12-694, 2012 WL 6602074, at *4 (La. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2012).  
 12. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *1. The long judicial battle, concerning 
whether state law was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act and federal law is not within the scope of this Comment. See 
Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 593 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2010) (reversing 
lower court opinion that held that federal law preempts state law in the context of 
private railway crossing closures).   
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court failed to acknowledge and apply the unique variations in the 
law of quasi-possession from the law of possession. Recognizing the 
potential for future confusion, Part III discusses necessary responses 
to the Franks decision. Specifically, it argues that future cases with 
facts similar to Franks should be judged solely using the concepts of 
quasi-possession and that the Louisiana Legislature should amend 
the Civil Code to better reflect the distinctive character of quasi-
possession as a separate area of law. Courts and legislators must 
take immediate action because it is imperative that the uniquely 
civilian nature of quasi-possession be preserved. 
I. A CLOUDED COURT: FRANKS INVESTMENT CO.  L.L.C. V. UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. 
Through diversity jurisdiction, a federal court heard Franks on its 
merits in June 2011.13 In deciding the case, the Franks court relied on 
the analogy found in Louisiana Civil Code article 3421, noting that 
“the rules governing possession apply by analogy to the quasi-
possession of incorporeals.”14 However, Louisiana jurisprudence and 
scholarship have suggested that the law of quasi-possession has 
unique variations from the law of possession.15 This Section 
addresses the manner in which the Franks court ignored these 
variations by strictly applying the law of possession to a quasi-
possession claim. The facts, the articulation of law, and the analysis of 
Franks demonstrate that the Franks court treated the quasi-possession 
of a right to cross a railroad crossway and the possession of an actual 
physical railroad crossway as one and the same thing. 
A. A Right of Way: The Facts of Franks 
Sometime before 1923, Franks’s predecessor in title purchased 
land in Caddo Parish, Louisiana.16 In 1923, full ownership of a parcel 
of that land was transferred to Union Pacific’s predecessor in title, 
Texas and Pacific Railway Company, for the company to lay and 
utilize its rail lines.17 The right-of-way extended for approximately 
two miles along Highway 1,18 and the deed included the following 
provision: 
                                                                                                             
 13. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *1. 
 14. Id. at *2. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421 (2013). 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. Brief for Appellant at 4, Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 464 F. 
App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-30632), 2011 WL 4350951, at *4. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *1. 
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It is understood and agreed that the Texas and Pacific 
Railway Company shall fence said strip of ground and shall 
maintain said strip of ground and shall maintain said fence at 
its own expense and shall provide three crossings across 
said strip at the points indicated on said Blue Print hereto 
attached and made part hereof and the said Texas and 
Pacific Railway hereby binds itself, its successors and 
assigns, to furnish proper drainage out-lets across the land 
herinabove conveyed.19 
Following the purchase, the railroad company developed four 
private crossways along the rail tracks.20 The company acted as the 
sole maintenance provider of the crossways and allowed neighbors 
to use them to access property on the other side of the railroad 
tracks.21 
A number of years later, Franks purchased the property adjacent 
to the railroad tracks.22 Upon purchase, the land consisted of 
approximately 1,000 acres, and the property boundaries were as 
follows: (N) public road, (S) public road, (W) Sand Beach Bayou 
and Bayou Pierre, and (E) right-of-way in favor of Union Pacific 
Railroad Company.23 The four private crossways still existed, and 
while there were three other access points to the property, the four 
private crossings permitted convenient access to and from the 
Franks property and the highway.24 
Over several years, Franks and its subsidiaries used the private 
crossways extensively.25 Joe Dill, a lessee of Franks, used the 
crossways to access the property and move his agricultural equipment 
to and from the highway.26 Additionally, pipeline inspectors, real 
estate developers, and those responsible for maintaining the sewer 
lines and levees on the property all used the crossways as an access 
point.27 In using the crossways, Franks admitted that it never 
                                                                                                             
 19. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 4. The title language suggests that 
the Franks case falls into Variation 1. See supra note 9. However, while a petitory 
action may have been available, counsel chose to bring the possessory action first. 
In a possessory action, the title to the land, the crossways, or even a servitude 
therein is irrelevant. See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 538; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE 
& TISSIER, supra note 10, at 116–17. The articulation in the deed is merely helpful 
in establishing how long Franks and its ancestors in title have utilized the 
crossways. 
 20. Brief for Appellant, supra note 16, at 4. 
 21. Brief for Appellee, supra note 7, at 7. 
 22. Id. at 9. 
 23. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *1. 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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intended to interfere with either Union Pacific’s ownership or its 
daily business; every day, at least six scheduled trains and one 
detour train traversed the Union Pacific tracks.28 
Union Pacific placed signs on all four private crossways that 
said: “Crossing. No trespassing. Right to pass by permission subject 
to control of owner.”29 Union Pacific, however, never accused 
Franks of trespassing, and the company made no attempt to prevent 
Franks and its subsidiaries from using the crossways.30 Additionally, 
Union Pacific often temporarily closed the crossways for 
maintenance and repair operations.31 Franks never placed any 
signage on the crossway and never intended to perform or fund any 
maintenance.32 
On May 17, 2005, Union Pacific placed a sign on one of the four 
crossways informing the public that the crossway was selected for 
closure.33 On October 7, 2005, it placed similar postage on the 
remaining three crossways.34 On December 27, 2007, Union Pacific 
closed the two northernmost crossings.35 Removal of the remaining 
crossways was pending when Franks filed a possessory action on 
January 7, 2008, seeking an injunction to force Union Pacific to 
rebuild the two destroyed crossings and refrain from breaking down 
the two remaining crossings.36 Franks claimed that it possessed a 
real right in each of the four private crossways.37 
B. Analogous Laws: Citing Possession Law in a Quasi-possession 
Case 
In deciding the claim, the court relied on a number of civil law 
property concepts articulated in the Louisiana Civil Code.38 To begin, 
the court explained that in a possessory action “the ownership or title 
of the parties to the immovable property or real right therein is not at 
issue”; only the possession of the real right is relevant for possessory 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at *2. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. As a reminder, only the real rights of predial and personal servitudes 
can be quasi-possessed. Necessarily, Franks claimed to quasi-possess either a 
predial servitude or a personal right of use in the railroad’s estate and crossways. 
See infra Part II.A. 
 38. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *2–4. 
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actions.39 The requirements for a possessory action are found in 
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3658.40 In light of article 
3658, the court correctly stated that a successful possessory action 
requires a showing that possession was established and maintained 
for more than a year such that the right to possess was gained and 
was never subsequently lost.41 
The court noted that possession is limited to corporeal things,42 
or “things that have a body, whether animate or inanimate, which 
can be felt or touched.”43 Intangible things, like the right Franks 
claimed in the crossways, are technically insusceptible of 
possession.44 However, the court briefly recognized that these things 
are susceptible to something similar to possession—quasi-
possession.45 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. Once again, title to the land, the crossways, or servitude therein is only 
relevant for a petitory action. Title or true ownership has no bearing for a 
possessory action. See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 538; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & 
TISSIER, supra note 10, at 116–17. 
 40. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3658 (2013). First, the possessor must prove that 
his possession was disturbed in fact or in law. Id. Disturbances in fact are actions 
that prevent a possessor from enjoying his possession quietly, like eviction or 
interactions with property. Id. art. 3659. Disturbances in law are actions that assert 
adverse ownership to the possessor’s property, like the drafting or filing of a 
document. Id. Next, the possessor must show that he had factual possession of the 
immovable property at the time the disturbance occurred. Id. art. 3658. Third, the 
possessor must show that he had possession “quietly and without interruption” for 
more than one year before the disturbance. Id. Courts have articulated this 
stipulation to require a showing of two things: (1) the possessor gained the right to 
possess, and (2) the possessor never lost the right to possess before the disturbance 
occurred. See Mire v. Crowe, 439 So. 2d 517, 522 (La. Ct. App. 1983). There are, 
however, two exceptions. When the possessor is evicted by force or fraud, he can 
protect his possession without having gained the right to possess. Art. 3658. 
Fourth, a possessor must file the possessory action within one year of the 
disturbance. Id. 
 41. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *2. 
 42. Id. 
 43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (2013). 
 44. JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, LOUISIANA LAW OF PROPERTY, A PRÉCIS 52 
(LexisNexis 2012). See also PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 341; BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 10, at 105. 
 45. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *2. See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 341; 
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 10, at 106. The word “quasi” is 
used commonly in the civil law tradition to reference a concept that would be 
exactly the same as its root but for one distinctive and determinative feature. For 
example, quasi-possession would be possession but for the fact that one cannot 
exercise physical acts over an incorporeal. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421 cmt. c (2013). 
The concepts, however, are analogous enough to constitute the use of a similar 
root. Other examples include the quasi-contract and quasi-occupancy. 
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Quasi-possession is “[t]he exercise of a real right, such as a 
servitude, with the intent to have it as one’s own.”46 Although the 
definition of quasi-possession seems to necessitate the existence of a 
real right in a servitude before the servitude can be quasi-possessed, 
such is not the case. As long as the potential servitude is apparent,47 
and thus capable of being obtained through acquisitive 
prescription,48 then the requirements for quasi-possession can be 
met without proof of title.49 A right of passage, like the one that 
Franks claimed, is an apparent servitude, capable of being quasi-
possessed without title.50 Despite quasi-possession’s civilian roots,51 
the current Civil Code provides no specific and direct rules to 
govern quasi-possession of intangible things. The Civil Code only 
provides that “the rules governing possession apply by analogy to 
the quasi-possession of incorporeals.”52 
                                                                                                             
 46. Art. 3421. 
 47. Apparent servitudes are those “that are perceivable by exterior signs, 
works, or constructions, such as a roadway, a window in a common wall, or an 
aqueduct.” Id. art. 707. 
 48. A servitude can be created through acquisitive prescription. TRAHAN, 
supra note 44, at 175; PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 735. Acquisitive prescription is a 
method by which possession turns into ownership. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3446 
(2013); PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 571. Specifically, after so many years of 
uninterrupted possession, the law provides the possessor with full ownership 
rights. Art. 3446; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 89. It is important to note that in the 
case of real rights less than ownership (like servitudes), a sufficient number of 
years of quasi-possession is required for acquisitive prescription. TRAHAN, supra 
note 44, at 89. Only apparent servitudes can be created by acquisitive prescription. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 742 (2013). With just title and good faith, a quasi-possessor can 
become owner of an apparent servitude after ten years of uninterrupted quasi-
possession. Id. arts. 742, 3473, 3475, 3480, 3481, 3482, 3483. Without just title and 
good faith, a quasi-possessor can become owner of an apparent servitude after 30 
years of uninterrupted quasi-possession. Id. arts. 742, 3473, 3475, 3480, 3481, 
3482, 3483. 
 49. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 182, at 491. 
Yiannopoulos provides: 
If plaintiff has no title and the servitude he claims is nonapparent, the 
availability of the possessory action depends on whether one may acquire 
the right to possess a servitude that may not be possessed and acquired by 
acquisitive prescription. Thus posed, the question contains its own 
answer: one may not acquire the right to possess a nonapparent servitude 
without title because one cannot possess such a servitude and acquire it 
by prescription. 
Id. 
 50. Art. 707. 
 51. See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 341; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, 
supra note 10, at 106. 
 52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421 (2013). See Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co., No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 6157484, at *2 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), aff’d, 464 
F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). “Incorporeals are things that have no body, but are 
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Relying on this analogy, the Franks court cited a number of 
Louisiana Civil Code articles regarding the possession of corporeals 
to decide Franks’s claim of an incorporeal right in the crossways.53 
In particular, the court cited Louisiana Civil Code article 3424, 
which notes that to establish possession over a thing, a person must 
show (1) corporeal possession of the thing and (2) intent to possess 
the thing as owner.54 This posits both a material and mental element 
into the possession analysis.55 
The material, or physical, element of possession is known as 
corpus in the civil law tradition.56 Louisiana Civil Code article 3425 
defines corporeal possession as “the exercise of physical acts of use, 
detention, or enjoyment over a thing.”57 In other words, corpus 
involves physical contact with a thing.58 While not explicitly 
annotated in the article, the level of physical contact with the thing 
must meet a certain threshold to be sufficient for the corpus element 
of possession.59 
                                                                                                             
 
comprehended by the understanding, such as the rights of inheritance, servitudes, 
obligations, and right of intellectual property.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (2013). 
 53. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *2. 
 54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3424 (2013). Corporeal possession is later defined in 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3425. 
 55. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 53. 
 56. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 302, at 599; TRAHAN, 
supra note 44, at 53; PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 342; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & 
TISSIER, supra note 10, at 118. The term corpus is not of Roman origin; instead, it 
was coined by Savigny. See FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VON SAVIGNY’S 
TREATISE ON POSSESSION (Erskine Perry trans., 6th ed. 1848). 
 57. Art. 3425. The term “use” is given its common meaning. TRAHAN, supra 
note 44, at 53. The terms “detention” and “enjoyment” are legal terms of art. Id. 
“Detention” means to hold or exercise custody over a thing, while “enjoyment” 
refers to taking the fruits of a thing. Id. Fruits are defined in Louisiana Civil Code 
article 551. 
 58. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 302, at 599; TRAHAN, 
supra note 44, at 53; PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 342. 
 59. To consider if contact with a thing is enough to meet the corpus element 
of possession, courts consider four general factors. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 53. 
First, courts consider whether the supposed possessor had title to the thing. Id. at 
54. Second, courts consider whether the supposed possessor was in good faith. Id. 
Third, courts consider the nature and condition of the thing. Id. Fourth, courts 
consider the duration of physical contact with the thing. Id. at 53. Accordingly, 
courts have found that things like growing crops, see Liner v. La. Land & 
Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766, 769 (La. 1975), and grazing cattle, see Souther v. 
Domingue, 238 So. 2d 264 (La. Ct. App. 1970), on land are enough to meet the 
element of corpus. While items like paying property taxes, see Manson Realty Co. 
v. Plaisance, 196 So. 2d 555, 556 (La. Ct. App. 1967), and occasional hunting or 
fishing, see Whitley v. Texaco, Inc., 434 So. 2d 96, 104–05 (La. Ct. App. 1983), 
on land are insufficient. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 304, at 
604; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 53. 
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The mental element of possession is known as animus domini.60 
Animus requires a possessor to intend to possess a thing as owner.61 
This specific intent is a subjective state of mind—not that the person 
believes that he is the owner but instead that the person intends to 
act as if he is the owner.62 Moreover, the Louisiana Civil Code does 
not explicitly require that a possessor be in good faith.63 The 
possessor must only make a conscious decision to hold a thing for 
himself and to hold and protect that thing against anyone if his stake 
in the thing is challenged.64 Accepting a grant of permission to use, 
detain, or enjoy a thing is the “kiss of death” for animus.65 Persons 
that detain items with permission are generally called precarious 
possessors.66 
The court noted that precarious possession is defined in 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3437 as “the exercise of possession 
over a thing with the permission of or on behalf of the owner or 
possessor.”67 The term “precarious possessor” is inherently 
confusing because precarious possessors are not “possessors” at 
all.68 Precarious possessors meet the corpus element for possession, 
but they do not meet the animus element because precarious 
possessors do not intend to own the things they use, detain, or 
enjoy.69 As such, precarious possessors do not have all the rights of 
true possessors.70 
                                                                                                             
 60. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 302, at 599; TRAHAN, 
supra note 44, at 54; PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 342–43; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE 
& TISSIER, supra note 10, at 106. The term animus domini is not of Roman origin; 
instead, it was coined by Savigny, who posited in his treatise on possession that 
intent to own a thing is an indispensible element of possession. See SAVIGNY, 
supra note 56. 
 61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3424 (2013). 
 62. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 54. See also PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 342–
43; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 10, at 106. 
 63. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 54. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, 
supra note 10, at 128. 
 64. See TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 55 (“From what has been said so far about 
the content of animus domini, it should be clear that a grant of ‘permission’ to use 
the thing is the ‘kiss of death’ for this state of mind.”); see also Harper v. Willis, 
383 So. 2d 1299 (La. Ct. App. 1980). 
 65. See TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 55; see also Harper, 383 So. 2d 1299. 
 66. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437 (2013). See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 362. 
 67. Art. 3437. See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 362; Franks Inv. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 6157484, at *3 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), 
aff’d, 464 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 68. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 301, at 598; PLANIOL, 
supra note 10, at 364; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 10, at 106. 
Remember that possession is a matter of fact; a person must sufficiently meet the 
elements of corpus and animus to be labeled a possessor. 
 69. The most common example of precarious possession is the lessor–lessee 
relationship. See Simon v. Charles, 689 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1997). The lessee 
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assumes the role of precarious possessor, while the lessor assumes the role of what 
one might call the “true possessor.” TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 65. The lessee 
generally asserts acts of use, detention, and enjoyment on the land, but he knows 
that he is not, and further does not intend to act like, the owner of the land he uses. 
The lessor, in contrast, does have the intention to act like he is the owner. Under 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3429, the lessee’s acts of use, detention, and 
enjoyment of the thing are of no benefit to the lessee; instead, these acts are 
attributed to the lessor’s possessory interests. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3428–29 (2013); 
TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 58. In turn, a lessor can meet the elements of 
possession (animus and corpus) without ever stepping foot on his own land. All of 
the acts of corpus by his lessees are transferable to his possessory interests. Arts. 
3428–29; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 58. See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 362–63. 
 70. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3439 cmt. c (2013). Establishing and maintaining 
possession results in a number of legal effects or rights. Most importantly, the 
possessor benefits from a presumption of ownership, see id. art. 3423, the 
possessor can acquire the right to possess, see id. art. 3422, and the possessor can 
protect his interests in a possessory action, see LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3655 
(2013). The presumption of ownership is articulated in Louisiana Civil Code 
article 3423, which states: “[a] possessor is considered provisionally as owner of 
the thing he possesses until the right of the true owner is established.” Art. 3423. 
This presumption gives the possessor an upper hand in any legal proceeding 
related to the thing in question. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 51, 72. When 
necessary, this automatically puts the burden of proving ownership on the 
challenging party. Id. at 72; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 10, at 
123. Proving ownership is a high burden. See generally YIANNOPOULOS, supra 
note 9, PROPERTY § 256–79, at 515–58; YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PREDIAL 
SERVITUDES § 176, at 476–79. Another effect of establishing factual possession 
over a thing is the potential for a possessor to gain the right to possess. Louisiana 
Civil Code article 3422 posits that “[p]ossession is a matter of fact; nevertheless, 
one who has possessed a thing for over a year acquires the right to possess it.” Art. 
3422 (emphasis added). The right to possess is not complex. After more than one 
year of possession, a possessor gains a judicially protectable right in a thing. 
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 310, at 614; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 
72. The right to possess, however, is subject to limitations. To establish the right to 
possess, possession must be sufficiently established from the outset; the 
possession must be without vice, see LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3435–36 (2013); 
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 314–18, at 623–29; TRAHAN, supra 
note 44, at 63–64, and the possession must be uninterrupted. YIANNOPOULOS, 
supra note 9, PROPERTY § 310, at 614. It is the case of an interruption that requires 
further discussion. Louisiana Civil Code article 3434 declares that possession is 
interrupted when the right to possess is lost. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3434 (2013). 
Similar to the factual state of possession, the right to possess can dissolve upon 
abandonment or eviction. Id. Upon abandonment, the right to possess is lost 
instantaneously. Id. See TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 72. In the case of eviction, the 
right to possess is only lost if after one year of being evicted a possessor has not 
regained possession. Art. 3434. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 
313, at 622; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 72; Mire v. Crowe, 439 So. 2d 517, 521–23 
(La. Ct. App. 1983); Liner v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 (La. 
1975). Possession can be regained in two manners. First, the possessor can recover 
possession by counterevicting the evicting party. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 72–
73. This would require an act that interferes with corpus and brings home to the 
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Under Louisiana Civil Code article 3438, a precarious possessor 
“is presumed to possess for another although he may intend to 
possess for himself.”71 To prove personal animus, a precarious 
possessor must terminate his precarious possession.72 With the 
exception of co-owners,73 a precarious possessor can terminate his 
precarious possession by providing actual notice to the person on 
whose behalf he began possessing.74 “Actual notice” has never been 
defined in the Civil Code,75 but scholars have provided some 
guidance in defining the term: 
This standard must mean something different from the 
standard that is applicable to co-owners, but precisely how it 
is different is not immediately clear. If the word “actual” as 
used in the expression “actual notice” has its common and 
generally prevailing meaning, which one must suppose it 
does, then what is required is notice in fact. To give such 
notice, the precarious possessor would have to inform the 
true possessor, be it in writing or orally, that he now intends 
to possess for himself, using more or less those very words. 
If that is so, then many of the kinds of acts that would suffice 
                                                                                                             
 
possessor that his dominion is seriously challenged. See Liner, 319 So. 2d 766; 
Evans v. Dunn, 458 So. 2d 650 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Richard v. Comeaux, 260 So. 
2d 350 (La. Ct. App. 1972). Second, the possessor can recover possession by filing 
a possessory action against the evictor. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 
313, at 622; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 72–73. If the possessory action is filed 
within one year of eviction, and the filer is successful in having his possession 
recognized, possession is officially recovered. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, 
PROPERTY § 313, at 621–22. Whether it be through reeviction or a successful 
possessory action, after possession is recovered, the law considers any interruption 
of possession to have never occurred. Id. at 622. As a result of establishing the 
right to possess and never losing it, the final legal effect of possession becomes 
available to the possessor—the possessory action. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 
3655. The possessory action is limited in availability to the possession of 
immovables. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 75; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, 
supra note 10, at 123–24. Protection of the possession of movables is left for 
revendicatory actions. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 75. 
 71. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3438 (2013). See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 367. 
 72. Art. 3439. See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 365. 
 73. Under the first paragraph of Louisiana Civil Code article 3439, a co-
owner, as a special precarious possessor, commences to possess for himself when 
“he demonstrates this intent by overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give 
notice to his co-owner.” Art. 3439. 
 74. Id. 
 75. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 321, at 635. 
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as “overt and unambiguous acts” by a co-owner will not be 
sufficient here.76 
Despite the exact definition of “actual notice,” once a precarious 
possessor provides what a court deems sufficient notice of his 
intention to possess for himself to the person on whose behalf he 
began possessing precariously, he becomes a “true possessor” with 
his own possessory interests.77 
Unless termination is successful, the only possible opportunity 
for a precarious possessor to protect his possession is under Civil 
Code article 3440.78 As a general rule, precarious possessors are 
allowed to bring possessory actions on behalf of the person for 
whom they are possessing.79 However, the Franks court noted that 
article 3440 limits the parties against whom the action can be 
brought to “anyone except the person for whom he possesses.”80 
C. A Rigid Application: Treating Franks as a Possession Case 
In applying the laws of possession to Franks’s quasi-possession 
case, the Franks court easily found that Franks met the corpus 
requirement for establishing possession because Franks and its 
subsidiaries had used the crossways extensively over several years.81 
The court, however, did not find that Franks had met the animus 
requirement for establishing possession. Specifically, the court held 
that Franks did not have animus because it was a precarious 
possessor.82 
In light of the facts, the Franks court called Franks a precarious 
possessor for three reasons. Specifically, Franks was a precarious 
possessor because (1) it used the crossways with permission, (2) its 
use of the crossways was not “adverse” to Union Pacific’s 
                                                                                                             
 76. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 67. 
 77. Id. 
 78. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3440 (2013). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.; Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 
6157484, at *3 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). 
Granting a precarious possessor the right to protect his precarious possession 
against third parties is a break from the civilian tradition. TRAHAN, supra note 44, 
at 80. This new legislative provision is the product of a number of cases that found 
that a precarious possessor was entitled to injunctive relief against third parties. 
Art. 3440. See, e.g., Indian Bayou Hunting Club, Inc. v. Tolbert, 294 So. 2d 894 
(La. Ct. App. 1974). 
 81. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *1–3. 
 82. Id. at *3. 
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ownership, and (3) it never sufficiently terminated its precarious 
possession.83 
Looking to the court’s first reason, Franks was a precarious 
possessor because, in using the crossways, it was acting with Union 
Pacific’s permission.84 By calling the actions of using the crossways 
permissive, the court relied on the fact that Union Pacific built, 
maintained, and operated the crossways with no assistance from 
Franks or its subsidiaries.85 It also found that Union Pacific’s “no 
trespass” signs showed that Union Pacific knew of the crossways 
and facilitated Franks’s use of them.86 Acting with Union Pacific’s 
permission, Franks could not develop the proper animus to act as 
owner of the crossways.87 
The court then reasoned that Franks was a precarious possessor 
because its use of the crossways was not “adverse” to Union 
Pacific’s ownership or possessory interests.88 The court specifically 
relied on the fact that Franks had never acted to put Union Pacific on 
notice that its ownership was being challenged.89 Franks testified 
that it never intended to interfere with Union Pacific’s ownership, 
operation, or daily business.90 
Finally, the court pointed to the fact that Franks never 
terminated its precarious possession.91 The court ruled that Franks 
failed to give Union Pacific sufficient actual notice of its intention to 
possess the crossways for itself because mere continuous use of the 
crossways had not been enough to terminate precarious 
possession.92 The court noted that Franks had not engaged in “overt 
and unambiguous” acts, such that Union Pacific would have 
believed that its possession and ownership had been challenged.93 
Because the court labeled Franks as a precarious possessor, it 
held that Franks had no personal possessory rights.94 Therefore, 
Franks could bring a possessory action against anyone except Union 
Pacific. Citing Louisiana Civil Code article 3440 as strong authority, 
the court held in favor of Union Pacific.95 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. at *3–4. 
 84. Id. at *3. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at *4. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See supra note 70. 
 95. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *4. 
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Overall, in holding for Union Pacific, the Franks court strictly 
applied the Louisiana Civil Code articles relating to possession. 
Specifically, the court focused on its determination that Franks had 
acted under Union Pacific’s permission to label it a precarious 
possessor and thus bar it from having a possessory action against the 
railroad company. Louisiana jurisprudence and scholarship have 
recognized, however, that permission plays a different role in quasi-
possession than it does in possession. The court failed to recognize 
this key distinction between the two areas of law, treating the 
claimed quasi-possession of a servitude in the crossways as 
possession of the physical crossways themselves. As such, the court 
applied improper reasoning by failing to acknowledge and apply the 
jurisprudentially recognized distinctions in the law of quasi-
possession. 
II. A LESS THAN PERFECT ANALOGY: THE UNIQUE APPLICATION OF 
QUASI-POSSESSION TO FRANKS INVESTMENT CO. L.L.C. V. UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. 
In deciding the Franks case, the court relied extensively on the 
proposition that the laws of possession apply by analogy to quasi-
possession.96 For years, however, scholars have recognized that this 
analogy is less than perfect.97 Specifically, there are jurisprudentially 
recognized differences in the law of quasi-possession when contrasted 
with the law of possession.98 These variations, while not necessarily 
codified, are persuasively relevant in quasi-possession cases like 
Franks.99 The Franks court, while applying the Civil Code articles 
relevant to possession appropriately on their facts, failed to recognize, 
acknowledge, or apply the unique law relevant to the quasi-
possession of incorporeals.100 
This Section articulates why the Franks case is poorly reasoned 
by pointing out the differences between the law of possession and 
the law of quasi-possession. First, it addresses the subject matter of a 
quasi-possession case—the servitude—specifically noting the ways 
in which the nature of a servitude, contrasted with that of a corporeal 
                                                                                                             
 96. Id. at *2. 
 97. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 178, at 481 
(“The rules governing possession of corporeal things apply also to the quasi-
possession of real rights to the extent that their application is compatible with their 
nature as incorporeals.” (emphasis added)); TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 53. 
 98. See infra Part II. 
 99. For an overview on how the Civil Code interacts with alternative sources 
and interpretations of law see A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, 
in LA. CIV. CODE XLIX−LXXII (2013). 
 100. See supra Part I.C. 
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object, can modify a court’s decision in a quasi-possession claim. 
Next, it addresses the differences in the elements of possession and 
quasi-possession, looking notably at Louisiana jurisprudence 
supporting the premise that, unlike possession, permission is not 
detrimental to the formulation of quasi-animus for a quasi-
possession case. Finally, this Section looks to the procedural matter 
that Louisiana Civil Code article 3440 addresses, positing that, 
unlike with possession, when suing under a quasi-possession theory 
of law, limited circumstances allow a precarious possessor to sue the 
person on whose behalf he is possessing .101 
A. The Varying Subject Matters of Possession and 
Quasi-possession—The Servitude 
The first variation between the law of possession and the law of 
quasi-possession appears in terms of subject matter. Possession 
relates to physical things,102 whereas quasi-possession relates to 
rights.103 Franks is squarely a quasi-possession case because the 
plaintiff articulated its claim as the possession of a real right in the 
land and crossways.104 Further, this right can only be understood in 
practice as either a predial or a personal servitude because, within 
the larger category of incorporeals, only those real rights105 that can 
be physically exercised are susceptible of quasi-possession.106 
Although Franks’s claim can only be understood as asserting the 
quasi-possession of a servitude, the Franks court decided the entire 
case without mentioning the word “servitude.” The court in no way 
spoke of a servitude’s nature or its impact on a quasi-possession 
claim. This was a mistake because a servitude’s intangible nature 
and structure makes its possession very different from that of a 
physical object. Accordingly, to decide the quasi-possession of a 
servitude, understanding its substance is imperative. 
                                                                                                             
 101. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3440 (2013). 
 102. Id. art. 3421. See TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 52–53. 
 103. Art. 3421. See TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 52–53. 
 104. Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 6157484, 
at *1 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 105. Real rights confer “direct and immediate authority over a thing.” LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 476 cmt. b (2013). These rights are not strictly personal. Strictly personal 
rights are generally called personal or credit rights. Credit rights merely confer 
authority over a certain debtor. The epitome of a credit right is a contract. Credit 
rights are governed by the law of obligations. See id. arts. 1756–2324.2. Unlike 
credit rights, real rights are rights that can be defended against any interfering 
party. Id. art. 1763 cmt. b. For more, see PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 623. 
 106. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 10, at 112 n.21 
(“Possession is not even applicable to all immovable real rights, but only those 
which can be physically exercised.”). 
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There are two types of servitudes in Louisiana, predial 
servitudes and personal servitudes.107 Predial servitudes involve 
rights connected to various estates. Louisiana Civil Code article 646 
provides that a predial servitude is a “charge on a servient estate for 
the benefit of a dominant estate.”108 Thus, there must be two 
separately owned estates for a predial servitude to exist.109 
One estate is the “servient” estate,110 the owner of which is 
charged with the duty not to do anything at all.111 This means that 
the servient estate’s owner must either (1) abstain from doing 
something he has the right to do on his own estate or (2) allow 
someone else to do something on the servient estate without 
interference.112 The other estate involved in a predial servitude is the 
“dominant” estate.113 This estate obtains a benefit from the predial 
servitude.114 Because a predial servitude’s duties and benefits are 
correlative, a dominant estate owner can obtain either (1) the right to 
prevent a servient estate owner from doing something on the 
servient estate that the servient estate owner would otherwise be 
able to do or (2) a right to do something on the servient estate that 
the dominant estate owner would not otherwise be able to do.115 
Limitations, however, are imposed on what rights can be 
“predialized.” Article 647 provides that “there is no predial 
servitude if the charge imposed cannot be reasonably expected to 
benefit the dominant estate.”116 The question turns not on whether 
only the owner who obtains the servitude will find the right useful, 
but instead on whether all future reasonable owners of the estate will 
                                                                                                             
 107. LA. CIV. CODE art. 533 (2013). 
 108. Id. art. 646. 
 109. Id. See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 698. 
 110. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 646, 651 (2013). See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 698. 
 111. Art. 651; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 157. 
 112. Art. 651; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 157. 
 113. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 646–47 (2013). See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 698. 
 114. Art. 646; TRAHAN, supra note 44 at 156. See PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 
698. 
 115. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 158. 
 116. Art. 647. “The law will allow contractual or testamentary freedom to the 
extent that a servitude may serve a useful purpose; unreasonable whims of the 
parties, serving no socially useful purpose, may not give rise to predial 
servitudes.” Id. cmt. b (emphasis added). Professor Trahan calls the dichotomy 
between useful benefits to the estate and other benefits that parties may want to 
predialize the difference between benefits to the estate and benefits to a person. 
TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 159. Benefits to an estate can be predialized, while 
mere benefits to a person cannot be predialized. Id. A benefit to the estate is “a 
benefit that any reasonable owner of the supposed dominant estate, in light of the 
nature, objective situation, or destination of the estate, would or at least might 
want to get.” Id. at 160. For more, see PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 698–99, 728–29. 
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find the right useful.117 In turn, although a right of passage can be 
predialized, a right to swim in a neighbor’s pool most probably 
cannot.118 
Personal servitudes are similar to predial servitudes with a few 
key distinctions. Specifically, “[a] personal servitude is a charge on 
a thing for the benefit of a person.”119 There are three types of 
personal servitudes:120 usufruct,121 habitation,122 and right of use.123 
All three can be the subject of quasi-possession; however, the most 
relevant for this discussion is the right of use. 124 A right of use is 
identical to a predial servitude but for one distinction.125 For a right 
of use, the right that the parties agree on does not benefit the 
dominant estate; it instead benefits an individual.126 In this way, the 
servient estate remains burdened with a duty no matter who owns it, 
but the counteracting right only benefits a person.127 It does not 
matter whether that person is tied to a certain estate.128 While the 
right-of-use benefit is personal to an individual, this real right is 
heritable and can be transferred to another contractually.129 
In the possessory action stage of property litigation, it does not 
matter whether Franks quasi-possessed a predial or a personal right-
                                                                                                             
 117. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 158–60. 
 118. Louisiana Civil Code article 699 provides further examples of rights that 
can be predialized. 
The following are examples of predial servitudes: right of support, 
projection, drip, drain, or of preventing drain, those of view, of light, or 
of preventing view or light from being obstructed, of raising buildings or 
walls, or of preventing them from being raised, of passage, of drawing 
water, of aqueduct, or watering animals, and of pasturage. 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 699 (2013). 
 119. Id. art. 534. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. The Louisiana Civil Code articles governing usufruct are articles 535–
629. See A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES, in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2000); TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 184–202. 
 122. Art. 534. Louisiana Civil Code articles 630 through 638 govern habitation. 
See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 121, PERSONAL SERVITUDES; TRAHAN, supra note 
44, at 203. 
 123. Art. 534. Louisiana Civil Code articles 639 through 645 govern a right of 
use. 
 124. Id. art. 639. Louisiana Civil Code article 639 provides that “the personal 
servitude of right of use confers in favor of a person a specified use of an estate 
less than full enjoyment.” Id. 
 125. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 203. 
 126. Id.; PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 630–31. 
 127. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 203; PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 630–31. 
 128. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 203; PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 630–31. 
 129. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 643–44 (2013). 
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of-use servitude.130 What courts have found determinative, however, 
is the common nature of how predial and personal servitudes are 
created. As intangibles that are tied to land in at least some part, 
servitudes cannot exist without some variation of human behavior. 
Specifically, the parties must agree to enter into a servitude 
agreement by creating a servitude through title,131 or the servitude 
                                                                                                             
 130. The issue as to what type of servitude to which a person has quasi-animus 
is generally left for discussion in the petitory phase of litigation. However, courts 
look to the servitude interpretation articles for guidance. See id. arts. 730–34. 
Louisiana Civil Code article 730 provides that “[d]oubt as to the existence, extent, 
or manner of exercise of a predial servitude shall be resolved in favor of the 
servient estate.” Id. art. 730. Accordingly, because a servitude burdens the servient 
estate and the free disposal and use of property, unclear agreements should always 
be interpreted to be a personal obligation or, at most, a personal servitude. Id. cmt. 
b. The above seems to be a hardline rule; however, reading further, the Code is 
slightly less clear. Louisiana Civil Code article 733 provides that “[w]hen the right 
granted be of a nature to confer an advantage on an estate, it is presumed to be a 
predial servitude.” Id. art. 733. Also, “[w]hen the right granted is merely for the 
convenience of a person, it is not considered to be a predial servitude, unless it is 
acquired by a person as owner of an estate for himself, his heirs and assigns.” Id. 
art. 734. Here, whether a predial or personal agreement is entered is not dependent 
on the burden to the servient estate, but instead, is dependent on the nature of the 
right in question. Louisiana Civil Code articles 732 through 734 are out of line 
with article 730. One offers a bright-line rule that parties generally do not intend to 
enter predial agreements. Art. 730. The other allows for the determination of 
whether a party intended to enter a predial or personal agreement to be based on 
the nature of the right in question. Id. arts. 732–34. Which one is the appropriate 
tool of interpretation? Courts are unsure; whether one method is used over another 
is generally left to the judge. See Parish v. Municipality No. 2, 8 La. Ann. 145 (La. 
1853); Burgas v. Stoutz, 141 So. 67 (La. 1932); Simoneaux v. Lebermuth & Israel 
Planting Co., Ltd., 99 So. 531 (La. 1924). For more, see PLANIOL, supra note 10, 
at 730−31. 
 131. Any predial or personal servitude can be created by title. TRAHAN, supra 
note 44, at 175. In the simplest of terms, two parties agree in written or oral 
contract that a servitude will be created between them. For a predial servitude, the 
agreement may look something like: “I, [insert party name], in my capacity as 
owner of the servient estate, grant [insert party name], in his capacity as owner of 
the dominant estate, a right of passage.” The right-of-use servitude may look like 
the following: “I, [insert party name], in my capacity as owner of the servient 
estate, grant a right of passage in favor of [insert party name].” Not all parties, 
however, have the legal capacity to create servitudes by title. Id. at 174. For 
example, the Civil Code provides that “[t]he right of imposing a servitude 
permanently on an estate belongs to the owner alone.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 708 cmt. 
b (2013). Accordingly, only the owner of a servient estate can impose a duty on 
that estate; however, in contrast, the owner or any person acting in his name or on 
his behalf can receive a benefit on behalf of the dominant estate or himself. Id. art. 
735; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 171–74. Finally, parties must be careful to fulfill 
the specific form requirements relevant to transfers by title. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
1833, 1837, 1839, 1541, 1543 (2013). For onerous transfers of servitudes, form 
requirements are met if the parties act under authentic act, act under private 
signature, or by oral agreement when the property is delivered and the transferor 
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will arise through operation of law because of some specific human 
behavior that creates a servitude through acquisitive prescription or 
destination.132 
If the parties agree to enter into a servitude through title, 
permission is a necessary element of the servitude’s creation. No 
matter what, there must be some point in time in which a servient 
estate owner allows a person to either come on to his property or 
allows that person to prevent him from doing something on his own 
property. The servitude agreement itself is a codification of the 
parties’ consent and permissive frame of mind. 
On the other hand, a servitude created through operation of law 
should technically arise only when no permissive act is involved. 
However, as evidenced in the following Section, when it comes to 
acquisitive prescription, Louisiana courts have allowed an informal 
permissive act to play a key role in quasi-possession and, 
furthermore, in the creation of servitudes.133 
This role that permission plays in the creation of servitudes, both 
inside and outside of the realm of title, not only makes servitude 
rights wholeheartedly different than corporeal objects, but it 
accordingly acts as the key distinction between the elements of 
possession and quasi-possession. 
                                                                                                             
 
recognizes the transfer under oath. Id. arts. 1833, 1837, 1839. For more, see 
PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 731–32. 
 132. For discussion of the creation of servitudes through acquisitive 
prescription, see supra note 48. Also, predial servitudes can be created by 
destination. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 177. Louisiana Civil Code article 741 
explains that “[d]estination of the owner is a relationship established between two 
estates owned by the same owner that would be a predial servitude if the estates 
belonged to different owners.” LA. CIV. CODE. art. 741 (2013). While it is 
technically possible for nonapparent servitudes, see id. art. 707, to be created by 
destination, it is rare. Art. 741; TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 178. As such, the 
concept is generally discussed in the context of apparent servitudes. In the most 
basic terms, when a landowner uses his single estate in a manner that is reflective 
of a predial servitude, if and when the single estate is divided into two, a predial 
servitude automatically comes into existence as between the two estates. TRAHAN, 
supra note 44, at 177–78. For example, say a landowner builds a driveway from 
the public road to the far end of his estate. He then sells the far end of his estate, 
while maintaining the ownership of the parcel closest to the public road. In the 
instant he divided his land, a predial servitude of passage was developed as 
between the two estates. The seller’s estate is now the servient one, and the 
buyer’s estate is the dominant one. The buyer, in his capacity as owner of the 
dominant estate, benefits from a right of passage on the driveway of the seller’s 
land.  
 133. See infra Part II.B. 
276 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
B. The Varying Elements of Possession and Quasi-possession 
Because the nature of predial and personal servitudes is 
distinguishable from that of corporeal immovables, the way in 
which servitudes can be quasi-possessed is distinguishable as well. 
Possession requires sufficient corpus, physical contact with a thing, 
and animus, intention to act like the thing’s owner.134 Quasi-
possession, however, requires sufficient quasi-corpus and quasi-
animus.135 Quasi-corpus is very similar to corpus. Applying 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3425 by analogy, quasi-corpus of a 
servitude is “the exercise of acts of use or enjoyment of the rights 
afforded by that servitude.”136 In turn, the mere use of a servitude 
right is enough to meet the threshold requirement of quasi-corpus.137 
Quasi-animus is much more complex than quasi-corpus. The 
definition of quasi-animus is provided by analogy in article 3421: 
“The exercise of a real right, such as servitude, with the intent to 
have it as one’s own is quasi-possession.”138 Accordingly, one must 
believe or, at the very least, decide to act as though a servitude right 
is his own to have quasi-animus in a servitude.139 Generally, in the 
possession context, permission is the “kiss of death” for animus; 
those that initiate possessive acts under a grant of permission are 
called precarious possessors.140 In fact, this general characteristic of 
possession was one of the determining factors in the Franks 
analysis.141 According to the court, Franks could not possess the 
right in the crossways because it was acting on behalf and with the 
permission of Union Pacific.142 However, the court failed to 
recognize that in the permission context, animus and possession are 
wholly and distinctly different from quasi-animus and quasi-
possession. 
As mentioned in the previous Section, unlike for possession, a 
permissive act plays a unique role in the creation of servitudes both 
within and outside the realm of title.143 Because of the role 
permission plays in servitude creation, permission from the servient 
                                                                                                             
 134. See supra Part I.B. 
 135. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 176. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 139. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 176. 
 140. See supra Part I.B. 
 141. Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 6157484, 
at *2 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 142. Id. See supra Part I.C. 
 143. See supra Part II.A. 
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estate owner does not preclude the dominant estate owner’s 
formulation of quasi-animus. 
When considering the quasi-possession of servitudes created 
through title, Louisiana property scholars recognize the following: 
Quasi-possession, far from being incompatible with such a 
grant of permission, presupposes it! Take, for example, the 
case in which one of two neighboring landowners grants to 
the other a predial servitude of passage across his estate. The 
“grant” of the servitude, by definition, entails a giving of 
permission, specifically, a giving of permission to enter upon 
and to cross the land. To be sure, with respect to the 
underlying thing—the corporeal immovable called the 
“servient estate”—the grantee of this servitude is but a 
“precarious possessor.” Nevertheless, with respect to the 
servitude right itself, he is still a (true) quasi-possessor.144 
A servitude created through title presupposes permission. By 
signing the servitude agreement, the servient estate owner is 
allowing the servitude holder to use his property. Accordingly, 
because permission is inherent to a servitude’s creation through title 
and because the law allows a servitude to be quasi-possessed, 
permission cannot necessarily preclude the intent or quasi-animus 
necessary for quasi-possession. 
Further, when considering how servitudes can be created 
through title, Louisiana courts have gone so far as to allow the 
creation of a servitude with an oral grant of permission to use 
property without any other formal documentation. This shows that 
even when a servitude does not yet exist, a quasi-possessor can 
form the proper quasi-animus for the quasi-possession of a 
servitude while working under permission from the servient estate 
owner. 
For example, in Guillotte v. Wells, a Louisiana court held that a 
pipeline right-of-use servitude was created by title after a landowner 
merely gave permission “as a neighbor” to the owner of adjacent 
property to build a gas line across his property and later 
acknowledged that permission under oath at trial.145 The court 
recognized that a servitude was created by title under the oral 
transfer exception found in Louisiana Civil Code article 1839, which 
                                                                                                             
 144. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 176. See also BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & 
TISSIER, supra note 10, at 161−62 (“A usufructuary is a precarious possessor since 
his very title implies the acknowledgment of the right of the naked owner. But 
with regard to the right of the usufruct he is not a precarious possessor, for he 
exercises and therefore possesses this right animo domini.”). 
 145. Guillotte v. Wells, 485 So. 2d 187, 189 (La. Ct. App. 1986). 
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requires delivery and recognition of the transfer under oath at 
trial.146 Delivery of a servitude is sufficient when either (1) the act of 
transfer is delivered or (2) the right is used by the dominant estate 
owner.147 In this case, the servitude was delivered when it was 
used.148 Additionally, the transferor, Wells, recognized the transfer 
under oath when he told the court that he granted Guillotte 
permission to connect his line across the Wells property.149 Overall, 
the court recognized that a mere neighborly grant of permission to 
use land for a limited purpose was enough to establish a real 
obligation on the property.150 
Even outside of the creation of servitudes through title, 
Louisiana courts have recognized that the proper quasi-animus for 
the quasi-possession of servitudes can be formed while acting under 
a grant of permission. In Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, the court held that a 
right-to-drain servitude was created through acquisitive prescription 
after Lapeyrollerie, as owner of Tract B, consented to digging a 
drainage line through Tract B to connect the alternatively owned 
neighboring Tracts A and C.151 The drainage canal was essential to 
Tract C; without it, Tract C could not be cultivated.152 The court 
recognized the servitude’s creation, noting that “[t]here is no dispute 
                                                                                                             
 146. Id. at 188. “A transfer of immovable property must be made by authentic 
act or by act under private signature. Nevertheless, an oral transfer is valid 
between the parties when the property has been actually delivered and the 
transferor recognizes the transfer when interrogated under oath.” LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 1839 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 147. LA. CIV. CODE art. 722 (2013). 
 148. Guillotte, 485 So. 2d at 189. 
 149. Id. at 188. 
 150. Id. at 191. See also Steinberg v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 927 So. 2d 
474, 478–79 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing the holding of Guillotte as reasonable 
in light of Louisiana Civil Code article 1839); Jones v. Tezeno 758 So. 2d 896, 
899 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing the holding of Guillotte in the context of the 
plaintiff’s asserted claim of a predial servitude by title); Miller v. Long Oil & Gas 
Exploration, Ltd., 542 So. 2d 75, 79–81 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that because 
a servitude can be verbally created through Guillotte, a servitude agreement can be 
orally amended); Marina Enters. v. Ahoy Marine Servs., 496 So. 2d 1080, 1084 
n.2 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that the servitude agreement between Blue Streak 
Enterprises and Ahoy Marine could have been proven even without a writing). But 
see Robert Inv. Co. v. Eastbank, Inc., 496 So. 2d 465, 469 (La. Ct. App. 1986) 
(noting that conventional predial servitude agreements must be in writing and 
disputes are always resolved in favor of the servient estate); Stinson v. Lapara, 62 
So. 2d 291, 294–95 (La. App. Ct. 1953) (“And surely it cannot be successfully 
contented that real property can be transferred by verbal agreement.”). 
 151. Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, 39 La. Ann. 210, 213 (La. 1887). Please note that 
there is a drafting mistake in the Southern Reporter edition of Levet. See Levet v. 
Lapeyrollerie, 1 So. 672, 674 (La. 1887). Please rely solely on the original text in 
the Louisiana Annual Reports series. 
 152. Levet, 39 La. Ann. at 213. 
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that the servitude here has been possessed or enjoyed for more than 
10 years without interruption.”153 This statement shows that the 
court set Levet’s quasi-possession time to start from the moment 
Lapeyrollerie granted the permission to dig the drainage canal across 
his land.154 The court also seemingly relied on the fact that the right 
that the parties contemplated—drainage—was of “real advantage to 
the estate.”155 Overall, this case provides that when permission is 
exchanged between parties and that permission involves a right that 
can be of real advantage to an estate, sufficient quasi-possession can 
begin for acquisitive prescription from the moment the right is 
contemplated and used by the parties.156 
Overall, as mere permission is enough to create a servitude, it 
cannot simultaneously hinder the quasi-possession of a servitude. 
Because of the nature of servitude rights and the jurisprudential 
trends in Louisiana, a potential quasi-possessor is more than capable 
of forming the proper quasi-animus for quasi-possession while 
acting under permission. As a result, quasi-possessors often embody 
a dual status, acting as both precarious possessors and quasi-
possessors simultaneously.157 Relative to the possession of corporeal 
property, they do not have sufficient animus and are precarious 
possessors having no possessory interests.158 However, relative to 
the quasi-possession of the incorporeal servitude, quasi-possessors 
are true possessors with proper quasi-animus and with full 
possessory interests.159 
                                                                                                             
 153. Id. Please note that this sentence is misprinted in its parallel citation of the 
Southern Reporter. Only rely on the original print in the Louisiana Annual Reports 
series. Id. at 210–13. Additionally, note that the law at the time of this case 
allowed for a servitude to be created by acquisitive prescription of ten years 
without just title and good faith. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 742 cmt. b (2013). 
 154. Levet, 39 La. Ann. at 214. 
 155. Id. at 213–14. See supra notes 116, 118. 
 156. But see YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 138–39, at 
399–402; PLANIOL, supra note 10, at 742–44. Notice that the holding of Levet 
seems to ignore the adverse intent generally necessary for an acquisitive 
prescription claim. The court seems to recognize the unique nature of a servitude 
and hold that as long as the right used is one of true advantage to the estate, it can 
be quasi-possessed for acquisitive prescription despite any permission involved. 
 157. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 66. 
 158. Id. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 10, at 161–62. 
 159. TRAHAN, supra note 44, at 66. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, 
supra note 10, at 161–62. Notably, the fact that quasi-possessors can be precarious 
possessors and quasi-possessors at the same time does not mean that the Louisiana 
Civil Code articles on precarious possession, see LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3437–40 
(2013), do not apply to quasi-possession cases. The best explanation is through 
example. Consider the Franks case. There were two apparent partnership 
relationships in the case. The most obvious was Franks and Union Pacific. 
However, there was a second: Franks and its subsidiaries. The court articulated 
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Further, the inherent nature of servitudes created by title, the 
holding in Guillotte, the holding in Levet, and the widely recognized 
dual status of quasi-possessors show that the Franks court was 
mistaken in allowing the court’s determination that Franks acted 
under the railroad company’s permission to preclude it from a 
remedy. While the court could have ultimately ruled for Union 
Pacific for alternative reasons, it could not allow the permissive act 
to be automatically determinative.160 Franks could have formed the 
proper quasi-animus in reference to the servitude-like language in 
the 1923 title agreement.161 Alternatively, in accordance with 
Guillotte, Franks could have formed the proper quasi-animus when 
it used a servitude right under Union Pacific’s permission that was 
later recognized under oath at trial. Under Levet, Franks could have 
even formed the proper quasi-animus from the moment the parties 
contemplated the right of passage. Any of these options were viable, 
yet the Franks court ignored them all, not even allowing the parties 
to address evidence relevant to this issue. Because of a quasi-
possessor’s dual status, the court correctly labeled Franks as a 
precarious possessor relative to its possession of the physical 
crossways; however, relative to the plaintiff’s true claim—the quasi-
possession of a servitude right—the court simply ended its inquiry 
prematurely. 
In fact, the court ended its inquiry so prematurely that it allowed 
its determination to completely preclude Franks from maintaining a 
cause of action.162 Once again, the Franks court was mistaken 
because, like the subject matter and elements of possession and 
quasi-possession, the parties against whom remedy is available in 
each field of law differ. 
                                                                                                             
 
that Franks let a number of its subsidiaries, like Dill, the pipeline inspector, the oil 
company, the real estate developer, and the sewer maintenance inspectors, use the 
crossways to enter the Franks property. Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 6157484, at *1 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), aff’d, 464 F. 
App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). Relative to Franks’s quasi-possession of the servitude 
in the crossways, these subsidiaries were precarious quasi-possessors. They did 
not have quasi-animus sufficient for quasi-possession. They used the right but not 
with the intent that it was their own. Accordingly, if any one of them wanted to 
protect its use of the servitude, it would be able to bring a possessory action 
against anyone except Franks, limited by article 3440. See Art. 3440. 
 160. The term “automatically” is used in reference to supra notes 150, 156 and 
accompanying text. It is possible for a court to accept jurisprudence conflicting 
with the holdings of Guillotte and Levet. However, because it is unclear, a court 
would have to allow the parties to present evidence as to this issue specifically. 
 161. See supra Part I.A. 
 162. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *4. 
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C. The Varying Parties Against Whom Remedy Is Available in 
Possession and Quasi-possession 
The final variation between possession and quasi-possession is 
the parties against whom the possessory action provides a remedy. 
For possession and the claimed possession of corporeal things, if a 
person is labeled as a precarious possessor, then, under Louisiana 
Civil Code article 3440, he can bring a possessory action against 
anyone except the person for whom he is possessing.163 Civil Code 
article 3440 is exactly what the Franks court relied on in barring 
Franks’s possessory claim.164 The court believed that Franks 
possessed the crossways on behalf of Union Pacific and, therefore, 
could not bring a possessory action against Union Pacific.165 The 
court failed to acknowledge, however, that quasi-possessors can also 
be true possessors of the right to cross land that another possesses 
and, as such, can bring an independent possessory action against 
anyone.166 
The same elements of the possessory action must be met for 
quasi-possession cases.167 However, whether a quasi-possessor can 
bring a possessory action against the possessor of the corporeal 
thing is dependent on what interests he is asserting in the action. If 
the quasi-possessor asserts his interest in the real right of the 
servitude, then he may bring a possessory action against anyone, 
including the possessor of the underlying corporeal thing.168 On the 
other hand, if the quasi-possessor brings an action to protect his 
precarious interests in the possession of that corporeal thing itself, 
he is limited by Civil Code article 3440.169 
                                                                                                             
 163. Art. 3440. 
 164. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *4. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 3655 provides that:  
The possessory action is one brought by the possessor of immovable 
property or of a real right therein to be maintained in his possession of 
the property or enjoyment of the right when he has been disturbed, or to 
be restored to the possession or enjoyment thereof when he has been 
evicted. 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3655 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 167. See supra note 40. 
 168. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 179, 186, at 
482, 496 (“The possessory action may be brought against any person who has 
caused a disturbance of possession, be he the owner of the servient estate or 
another person.”); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 186, at 
496. 
 169. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3440 (2013). 
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Franks exclusively asserted an interest in a real right burdening 
Union Pacific’s land and crossways.170 It did not purport to possess 
the physical crossways.171 Accordingly, article 3440 did not bar it 
from bringing a possessory action against Union Pacific to assert a 
quasi-possessory right to cross the land. In asserting its interest in 
the quasi-possession of a right to traverse the crossways, Franks was 
capable of bringing a possessory action against anyone, including 
Union Pacific. 
Overall, in deciding the Franks claim, the court failed to 
recognize and distinguish the unique variations between possession 
and quasi-possession, such as the nature of the thing quasi-
possessed, the elements necessary for quasi-possession, and the 
parties against whom a quasi-possession claim can be brought. The 
court instead treated Franks’s claim in a real right connected to the 
crossways as if it was purely a claim for possession of the physical 
crossways themselves.172 In doing so, the court blurred the lines 
between possession and quasi-possession to such a degree that the 
case can in no way serve as proper precedent for future quasi-
possession jurisprudence. 
III. A LASTING EFFECT: APPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO FRANKS 
INVESTMENT CO. L.L.C. V. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. 
In light of the court blurring the concepts of possession and 
quasi-possession, Franks has the potential to effectuate a number of 
poor consequences. Most importantly, Louisiana courts and lawyers 
are likely to be confused about the concept of quasi-possession in 
the future. It is not necessarily true that the Franks court’s ultimate 
holding in favor of Union Pacific is incorrect. Instead, the court 
utilized the wrong line of reasoning, not even allowing the plaintiff 
and defendant in the case to present relevant evidence on the true 
issue—the quasi-possession of a servitude in the land and 
crossways.173 
As such, the poor analysis in the case has the potential to 
confuse quasi-possession jurisprudence, extending far beyond that 
concerning railroads and farmers. For example, any common 
servitude case regarding a right of passage on a neighbor’s driveway 
to access property could be considered a claim for the possession of 
                                                                                                             
 170. Franks, 2011 WL 6157484, at *1. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at *1–4. 
 173. The Franks court adjudicated the case from the sole perspective of the 
physical crossways. The court did not mention the term and considered no 
evidence regarding cases similar to, or even opposing, Levet or Guillotte. 
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the driveway itself. A case regarding a right to utilize a drainage line 
could be treated instead as a claim for the possession of the actual 
land. In this manner, quasi-possessors would never be capable of 
moving beyond their simultaneous status as precarious 
possessors.174 Servitude holders and users could be completely 
barred from bringing a possessory action against the grantor of the 
servitude. 
It is imperative that the above result be prevented. Specifically, 
future cases with similar facts to Franks should utilize a pure quasi-
possession line of reasoning, and the Louisiana Legislature should 
amend the Civil Code to clarify the faulty proposition that the laws 
of possession apply by analogy to the quasi-possession of 
incorporeals.175 
A. An Exemplary Case: How Future Louisiana Cases Like Franks 
Should Be Decided Using Quasi-possession Principles 
The Franks court blurred the lines between possession and 
quasi-possession, utilizing the incorrect line of reasoning relative to 
Franks’s asserted interest of a real right burdening the Union Pacific 
land and crossways.176 Because it is likely that cases with similar 
facts will be filed throughout the state, it is imperative that federal 
and Louisiana state courts acknowledge and apply the unique 
aspects of the law of quasi-possession. Future possessory actions, 
filed to assert quasi-possession of a real right, should be decided 
using principles of quasi-possession alone. 
Franks’s holding and line of reasoning are of no true 
precedential value. The facts of Franks, however, are exemplary for 
articulating a proper line of reasoning for a quasi-possession case. 
Four items should concern courts within a quasi-possession 
possessory action: (1) whether the plaintiff developed sufficient 
quasi-corpus; (2) whether the plaintiff developed sufficient quasi-
animus; (3) whether both lasted for more than a year such that the 
right to quasi-possess was gained; and (4) whether the right to quasi-
possess was never subsequently lost.177 Using this and the Franks 
facts as a framework, a future quasi-possession case like Franks 
could be successful. 
                                                                                                             
 174. See supra Part II.B. 
 175. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421 (2013). 
 176. See supra Part II. 
 177. Applying the requirements of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 
3658 by analogy. See supra note 40. 
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First, a court must consider quasi-corpus. Sufficient quasi-
corpus for the quasi-possession of real rights is mere use.178 Under 
facts like those in Franks, this element is likely met. Franks and its 
subsidiaries used the crossways continuously for a number of years, 
most notably of which was Joe Dill, a lessee who used the 
crossways to access the property and move his agricultural 
equipment to and from the highway.179 These acts should be enough 
to constitute use sufficient for the quasi-corpus element for quasi-
possession. 
Second, a court must consider quasi-animus. This element was 
the determining factor for the court in Franks; however, as posited 
in this Comment, the court mistakenly came to its determination 
under the framework of the law of possession. The following 
analysis is more appropriate for a quasi-possession case. 
Quasi-animus is the intent to hold a real right as one’s own.180 
Unlike for possession, evidence that a potential quasi-possessor used 
a servitude with permission does not automatically preclude the 
proper formulation of quasi-animus.181 Beyond established 
presumptions,182 courts must only consider whether the potential 
quasi-possessor acted in a manner reflective of dominion over a real 
right.183 Under facts like those in Franks, the quasi-animus element 
would likely be met as well. The fact that servitude-like language 
existed in the deed to the property is persuasive evidence that a 
servitude of passage was created through title.184 Accordingly, 
because a servitude created through title presupposes permission, 
that permission does not preclude the development of quasi-
animus.185 Further, Franks acted in a manner reflective of an intent 
to use the servitude right as its own. Specifically, Franks extended 
its right to others.186 Franks gave permission to Dill and other 
workers to use a right to cross as if Franks exclusively had the 
power to do so. This exercise of dominion over a right to cross is 
probably reflective of an assertion of ownership.187 
                                                                                                             
 178. See supra Part II.B. 
 179. Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 6157484, 
at *1 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 180. See supra Part II.B. 
 181. See supra Part II.B. 
 182. One who establishes quasi-corpus is presumed to have quasi-animus. See 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427 (2013). 
 183. See supra Part II.B. 
 184. See supra Part I.A. 
 185. See supra Part II.B. 
 186. Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 6157484, 
at *1 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 187. For examples of acts that are reflective of an assertion of ownership, see 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3431 cmt. d (2013). 
2013] COMMENT 285 
 
 
 
Third, courts must guarantee that the right to quasi-possess has 
been gained. The establishment of sufficient quasi-corpus and 
quasi-animus for more than one year results in a quasi-possessor 
gaining the right to quasi-possess.188 The right to quasi-possess 
grants a quasi-possessor a judicially protectable right in a certain 
thing.189 Under facts similar to Franks, it is highly probable that the 
right to quasi-possess was gained. Both the elements of quasi-
corpus and quasi-animus were probably met, and they would likely 
have lasted more than a year because the crossways were developed 
in 1923 and Franks brought the action in 2008.190 
Finally, courts must guarantee that the right to quasi-possess has 
never been lost.191 For this inquiry, courts commonly consider 
whether the quasi-possessor was ever evicted.192 The right to quasi-
possess is not lost post-eviction as long as the quasi-possessor 
regains quasi-possession or files a possessory action within one year 
                                                                                                             
 188. Id. art. 3422. 
 189. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 310, at 614; TRAHAN, 
supra note 44, at 72. 
 190. See supra Part I.A. 
 191. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3434 (2013). See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, 
PROPERTY § 313, at 622; TRAHAN, supra note 44 at 72; Mire v. Crowe 439 So. 2d 
517, 521–23 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Liner v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 
766 (La. 1975). 
 192. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3421, 3433, 3434 (2013). For general possession, 
Louisiana Civil Code article 3433 recognizes the concept of eviction, noting that 
“possession is lost when the possessor . . . is evicted by another by force or 
usurpation.” Louisiana jurisprudence posits two criteria for eviction: (1) there must 
be an act by another that prevents the possessor from doing physical acts with the 
thing he possesses (corpus); and (2) this act must be such that if the actual 
possessor would have witnessed it, it would have “seriously challenged” the 
possessor’s dominion. See Liner v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 319 So. 2d 766 
(La. 1975); Evans v. Dunn, 458 So. 2d 650 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Richard v. 
Comeaux, 260 So. 2d 350 (La. Ct. App. 1972). Courts have found items like 
erecting a fence or other enclosure to be sufficient for eviction; however, acts such 
as occasionally mowing grass on another’s land will not be adequate. 
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 9, PROPERTY § 313, at 620. Eviction for quasi-
possession purposes is more complex than for the purposes of regular eviction of 
possession. Specifically, to evict a quasi-possessor a person “must exercise the 
right according to its nature with the intent to have it as ones own.” Id. at 622. 
Because the nature of a real right is different than that of a corporeal thing, the acts 
that a person must do to interfere with quasi-corpus must meet a higher threshold 
than those for regular eviction. Specifically, the act must actually interfere with a 
quasi-possessor’s use of his right. Id. For example, if a servitude agreement 
contemplates the right to pass across a driveway in the morning, adverse use of the 
driveway at night would not be sufficient for eviction. While the standard is high, 
courts have found that eviction can occur if a building that inhibits the use of a 
quasi-possessor’s real right is constructed. Id. 
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of the eviction.193 Under facts similar to Franks, the right to quasi-
possess was likely maintained. The only act of Union Pacific that 
was intrusive enough to constitute an eviction was its complete 
removal of the crossways.194 Franks, however, filed the possessory 
action to maintain the right to quasi-possess well within one year of 
that eviction. 
Overall, it is very likely that future possessory actions with 
similar claims and facts to Franks could be successful. While the 
result in future cases may differ, cases with similar facts can use the 
above reasoning to adjudicate a pure quasi-possession claim. 
B. A Need for Clarification: Call to the Louisiana Legislature 
In light of the complexity of quasi-possession, it is unsurprising 
that the Franks court incorrectly applied the quasi-possession 
analogy laid out in Louisiana Civil Code article 3421 on 
possession.195 Accordingly, the Louisiana Civil Code must 
accurately reflect how Louisiana courts and scholars treat quasi-
possession cases. To prevent any further confusion, the Louisiana 
Civil Code should be amended to include the following:196 
Article 3421: Possession 
Possession is the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal 
thing, movable or immovable, that one holds or exercises by 
himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name. 
 
The exercise of a real right, such as a servitude, with the 
intent to have it as one’s own is quasi-possession. The rules 
governing possession apply by analogy to the quasi-
possession of incorporeals. 
 
Proposed Amendment: 
Possession is the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal 
thing, movable or immovable, that one holds or exercises by 
himself or by another who keeps or exercises it in his name. 
 
The exercise of a real right, such as a servitude, with the 
intent to have it as one’s own is quasi-possession. The rules 
                                                                                                             
 193. In this context, quasi-possession is exactly the same as possession. See 
supra note 70. 
 194. Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., No. 08-0097, 2011 WL 6157484, 
at *2 (W.D. La. June 14, 2011), aff’d, 464 F. App’x 415 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 195. Art. 3421. 
 196. The italicized language encompasses proposed additions to the current 
Louisiana Civil Code. 
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governing possession apply by analogy to the quasi-
possession of incorporeals to the extent that their application 
is compatible with the nature of incorporeals. 
 
Article 3437: Precarious possession 
The exercise of possession over a thing with the permission 
of or on behalf of the owner or possessor is precarious 
possession. 
 
Proposed Amendment: 
The exercise of possession over a thing with the permission 
of or on behalf of the owner or possessor is precarious 
possession. 
 
Precarious possessors can hold a dual status. They may be 
precarious possessors relative to a corporeal and quasi-
possessors relative to an incorporeal simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, the use of an incorporeal, such as a servitude, 
without the intent to have it as one’s own is precarious 
quasi-possession. 
 
Article 3440: Protection of precarious possession 
Where there is a disturbance of possession, the possessory 
action is available to a precarious possessor, such as a lessee 
or a depositary against anyone except the person for whom 
he possesses. 
 
Proposed Amendment: 
Where there is a disturbance of possession, the possessory 
action is available to a precarious possessor, such as a lessee 
or a depositary against anyone except the person for whom 
he possesses. 
 
If asserting only the quasi-possession of an incorporeal, 
precarious possessors who are also quasi-possessors may 
bring a possessory action against anyone. Nevertheless, a 
precarious quasi-possessor may bring a possessory action 
against anyone except the person for whom he quasi-
possesses the incorporeal. 
 
In amending the Civil Code, the comments to article 3437 must 
reflect the fact that permission is not a burden on establishing the 
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proper quasi-animus for quasi-possession cases.197 When the quasi-
possession is of an existing servitude, the actual creation of that 
servitude presupposes a permissive act.198 When the quasi-
possession is of a potential servitude, cases such as Guillotte and 
Levet show that Louisiana courts recognize that the development of 
the proper quasi-animus for a quasi-possession claim is possible, 
despite any permission involved.199 
These revisions would in no way change the law. Rather, they 
would simply clarify it. In amending the Code, the Legislature 
would ensure that the incorrect line of reasoning reflected in Franks 
would not be utilized in future quasi-possession cases. Consequently, 
courts would no longer be able to blur the lines between possession 
and quasi-possession to such a degree that the concepts are treated as 
one and the same. Although they are admittedly analogous in many 
respects, quasi-possession is not possession. Its unique nature and 
treatment must be preserved. 
CONCLUSION 
In Franks Investment Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the court 
failed to acknowledge and apply the unique variations that make 
quasi-possession distinguishable from possession. Consequently, the 
court blurred the lines between quasi-possession and possession to 
such a degree that this case could cause confusion in the area of quasi-
possession for many years. Recognizing this potential for confusion, 
future cases with similar facts to Franks must be decided using solely 
the principles of quasi-possession. Additionally, the Louisiana 
Legislature should amend the Civil Code to adequately reflect the 
manner in which courts and scholars treat the uniquely civilian 
concept of quasi-possession. 
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